Abstract. We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible direct mechanisms where overreporting the budget is not possible. In several settings, reporting larger budgets can be made suboptimal with a small randomized modification to the payments. We then derive a closely related partial characterization for the general case where players can arbitrarily misreport their private budgets. Immediate applications of these results include simple characterizations for mechanisms with publicly-known budgets and for mechanisms without monetary transfers. The celebrated revenue equivalence theorem states that the seller's revenue for a broad class of standard auction formats and settings will be the same in equilibrium. Our main application is a revenue equivalence theorem for financially constrained bidders.
Introduction
Budget constraints are central to big business auctions. Cramton(1995) states that it realistic to assume that all firms participating in the historic PCS telecommunications spectrum license auction, held on July 1994 by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), were faced with budget constraints. In Google's GSP keyword auction and other search engine advertising platforms, the bidders are required to specify their bids as well as their budget limits (Edelman et al.(2007) , Varian(2007) and Aggarwal et al.(2009) ).
Classical results in mechanism design literature do not necessarily carry over to common scenarios with budget constraints. Ausubel and Milgrom(2002) showed that the dominant-strategy of the VCG auction breaks down when bidders have limited budgets.
1 Che and Gale(1998) showed a revenue dominance of the standard first-price auction over second-price auction in the presence of budget constraints. On the positive side, several incentive-compatible auctions do carry over. The classical multiple object ascending auction for unit-demand bidders due to DGS generalizes so as to accommodate incentive-compatible auctions for financially constrained bidders (Hatfield and Milgrom(2005) and Aggarwal et al.(2009) ).
In this paper we find that Rochet's cyclic-monotonicity condition extends to multidimensional environments with private budgets. We show how to circumvent the assumption that players always have the ability to pay up to their respective values, while obtaining a characterization result and a corresponding graph in the same spirit as Rochet. Our second contribution is a generalization of the revenue equivalence characterization by Heydenreich et al.(2009) to multidimensional environments with private budgets.
Organization of this paper
In Section 2 we derive a simple characterization for multidimensional dominantstrategy incentive-compatible mechanism design without money. Section 3 studies multidimensional dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism design with private budgets. We start with a necessary condition for incentive-compatible private budget settings. We next show the sufficiency of this condition if overreporting the budget is impossible. We then consider a strengthening of this condition and show its sufficiency for the general case (where players can report any budget).
Section 4 shows a revenue equivalence principle for private budget settings (where players can report any budget) satisfying certain reasonable conditions. Section 5 illustrates the results through examples. All absent proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Warm-up: Characterizing Mechanism Design without Money
In this section we consider a multidimensional setting with private values where monetary transfers are infeasible. We show a simple characterization for players with cardinal preferences.
The Model
We consider a setting with n players and a finite set A of possible outcomes. Player ℓ's private valuation is determined by v ℓ ∈ V ℓ ⊆ IR |A| , where v ℓ (a) is player ℓ ′ s value for outcome a ∈ A, and V ℓ is the space of all possible valuations of player ℓ. Let V = V 1 × · · · × V n denote the total valuation space. We consider a multidimensional setting with private values (where v ℓ (a) can be nonnegative or negative) and publicly known zero budgets.
A mechanism design without money f consists of a social choice function f : V × 0 → A and a zero payment scheme p : V → 0, where 0 ∈ IR n . In a direct revelation mechanism without money, the social choice function chooses for a vector v ∈ V of aggregate reports of all players an outcome f (v, 0), whereas the payment scheme assigns a zero payment to each player. A mechanism design without money can be regarded as a mechanism for players with publicly-known zero budgets, where monetary transfers are not feasible. Let (v ℓ , v −ℓ ) denote the aggregate report vector when player ℓ reports v ℓ and the other players' reports are represented by v −ℓ .
Definition 1. A direct revelation mechanism without money f : V × 0 → A is called dominant-strategy implementable if for every player ℓ, every v ℓ , v ′ ℓ ∈ V ℓ and v −ℓ ∈ V −ℓ , the following condition holds:
Remark 1. When clear from context we will sometimes use the term implementability to denote dominant-strategy implementability.
Presentation Assumptions
Throughout the paper we without loss of generality restrict our attention to a model with a single agent (say, player ℓ) and assume reported valuations v −ℓ and budgets of all other players B −ℓ to be fixed. This is without loss of generality as all relevant definitions can be interpreted by holding all other players' reports fixed. For simplicity of notation when clear from context we suppress the subscript ℓ and write V, v and B instead of V ℓ , v ℓ , and B ℓ . For convenience, we also assume that f is onto (since otherwise A can be condensed to be the range of f ).
The Characterization
For two outcomes a and a ′ let
Informally, δ(a, a ′ ) represents the least gain achieved by deviation from a to a ′ , when a is chosen by truthful reporting and a ′ is chosen by misreporting (while keeping the valuation of other players fixed). Since f is onto, δ(a, a ′ ) < ∞. We can now state our simple characterization for implementable mechanisms without money. Proposition 1. A mechanism without money f : V × 0 → A is dominantstrategy implementable if and only if δ(a, a ′ ) ≥ 0 for every a, a ′ ∈ A.
Proof. Assume f is implementable without money. For any pair of valuations
Characterizing Mechanism Design with Private Budgets
In this section we study dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms in a multidimensional setting where players have private valuations and private budgets.
We continue with the private value setting introduced previously using the following modifications. Player ℓ has private valuation v ℓ ∈ V ℓ ⊆ IR |A| + , where v ℓ (a) is player ℓ ′ s nonnegative value for outcome a ∈ A. In addition, player ℓ has private budget B ℓ ≥ 0. Let B ℓ ⊆ IR + ∪ ∞ denote the space of all possible budget limits of player ℓ. Notice that if the budget of player ℓ is public knowledge then the set B ℓ is a singleton.
Players are assumed to be utility maximizers but can never pay beyond their budgets. Specifically, player ℓ's utility with private budget B ℓ , derived for paying x ≥ 0 for outcome a, is v ℓ (a) − x as long as x ≤ B ℓ and is negative infinity if x > B ℓ . Note that we consider here a multidimensional setting with nonnegative private values and private budget constraints.
A mechanism (f, p) with private budgets consists of a social-choice function f : V × B → A and a payment function p : V × B → IR n , where V = V 1 × · · ·× V n , B = B 1 × · · · × B n and the ℓ th component of p is the payment requirement of player ℓ. We restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms where each player reports its private valuation v ℓ ∈ V ℓ , as well as its private budget B ℓ ∈ B ℓ . Let v −ℓ , B −ℓ denote the reported valuations and budgets of players other than ℓ.
Definition 2. A direct revelation mechanism (f, p) with private budgets is called dominant-strategy implementable (or implementable, for short) if the following conditions hold:
1. (IC) Incentive Compatibility: For every player ℓ = 1, . . . , n, every v × B ∈ V × B, and every v
i.e., no player can improve its utility by misreporting its true private valuation and/or true private budget in order to obtain some other outcome whose payment is below B ℓ . If the budget is public knowledge then players can only report their true budgets. If budget over-reporting is not allowed, then
The mechanism never requires a player to pay more than its reported value. 3. (BF) Budget Feasibility: The mechanism never requires a player to pay more than its reported budget. 4. (NPT) No Positive Transfer: The mechanism never subsidizes any player with a monetary amount.
Definition 3. A social choice function f with private budgets is called implementable if there exists a payment function p such that the mechanism (f, p) is dominant-strategy implementable.
Graph Theoretic Definitions. To state our main results we use some basic definitions from Graph Theory. Recall that a (directed) graph is a pair G(M, E), where M is a finite set and E ⊆ M × M . An element n ∈ M is called a node and an element e = (n,
A (finite) path from node n 1 to node n k in G is a sequence P = (n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) in E such that e i = (n i , m i ) ∈ E and n i+1 = m i , where i = 1, . . . , k − 1. We denote by e ∈ P that e is an arc in P . A (finite) cycle in G is a path C = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e k ) such that m k = n 1 . When clear from the context, the cycle C may be written as (n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ). To each arc e ∈ E we assign a length l(e) ∈ IR. The length of a path P is l(P ) = Σ e∈P l(e). A path P is called negative if l(P ) < 0. We denote by ∆(n i , n k ) the length of the shortest path from node n i to node n k in G.
A strongly connected component of a directed graph G = (M, E) is a maximal set of vertices K ⊆ M such that for every pair of nodes n i and n j in K, there is a path from n i to n j , and a path from n j to n i . A directed acyclic graph is a directed graph with no cycles.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Private Budgets
Our main result in this section is a necessary and sufficient conditions for the multidimensional private budget setting. Theorem 1 provides a necessary condition for implementability. Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 show the sufficiency of the condition in Theorem 1 in several settings. The proof technique is constructive; namely, a concrete payment function is specified to show the sufficiency. Examples 1 and 2 in Section 5 further demonstrate our conditions.
For a ∈ A, we define
i.e., β(a) is the minimum reported budget required to obtain outcome a, and ω(a) is the minimum reported valuation required to obtain outcome a. Therefore, θ(a) serves as an upper bound on any budget-feasible individuallyrational payment for outcome a, if exists. Since f is onto, θ(a) < ∞.
The next definition is a generalization of (1) to the private budget setting.
We follow the convention that the infimum over an empty set equals
Using δ and θ, we can now construct a finite directed graph associated with the social choice function f . G f, B ) . Let G f, B be a complete directed graph over the nodes M (G f, B ) = {1, 2, . . . , |A|}, i.e., the nodes of the graph correspond to all possible outcomes. The length of a directed arc
Definition 4 (The Graph
We can now state our necessity result: Theorem 1. If a social choice function f : V × B → A with private budgets is implementable then the corresponding graph G f, B contains no negative cycles.
We now consider the case where over-reporting the budget is impossible and show the sufficiency of the condition in Theorem 1. This allows us to derive a complete characterization of the class of implementable social choice functions where over-reporting the private budget is impossible. This class is rather general, it includes mechanisms without money, mechanisms for players with publicly-known budgets and more. In several settings, reporting larger budgets can be made a dominated strategy (suboptimal) by using a small randomized modification to the payments (Bhattacharya et al.(2010) ).
Theorem 2. A social choice function f : V × B → A for private budgets with no budget over-reporting is implementable if and only if the corresponding graph G f, B contains no negative cycles.
Example 1 shows that the no budget over-reporting assumption is crucial to the sufficiency in Theorem 2. Notice that Proposition 1 is not a special case of Theorem 2, since here we restrict the values to be nonnegative.
We now consider the general setting of private budgets (assuming players can report any budget limit) and provide a sufficient condition for implementability, that differs from the necessary condition in Theorem 1. Our sufficient condition for implementability requires a subtle but crucial change in (5). For a, a ′ ∈ A, we define
Definition 5 (The Graph G f, B ). Let G f, B be a complete directed graph over the nodes M (G f, B ) = {1, 2, . . . , |A|}, i.e., the nodes of the graph correspond to all possible outcomes. The length of a directed arc (i, k) ∈ E(G f, B ) is defined as
If the graph G f, B contains no negative cycles then so does G f, B , but not vice versa.
We can now state our sufficiency results for private budgets (assuming players can report any budget limit). Example 2 shows an implementable social choice function whose corresponding graph G f, B contains a negative cycle. However, if G f, B = G f, B , then the condition in Proposition 2 is also necessary. Proof. Immediate from Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 (notice that Theorem 2 is of no use here, since players can over-report their budget limits).
⊓ ⊔
Revenue Equivalence with Budgets
The celebrated revenue equivalence principle says that any two payment function implementing the same social choice function differ by a constant, and thus the payment function is uniquely defined up to an additive constant. The uniqueness for budget constraints players is slightly more subtle.
Recall that by Lemma 1 (using the presentation assumptions in Subsec-
′ ) = p a . When players have budget constraints, any two payment functions implementing the same f : V × B → A might be differ by a collection of constants. Intuitively, there might be a distinct constant for every budget level β(a), where β(a) denotes the minimum reported budget required to obtain outcome a ∈ A.
Definition 6 (Revenue Equivalence). An implementable social choice function f : V × B → A satisfies the revenue equivalence principle if for every two dominant strategy implementable mechanisms (f, p) and (f, p ′ ), we have that
need not be equal to p a − p ′ a .
Assumptions
We shall show, under several reasonable assumptions, that a necessary and sufficient condition for revenue equivalence with private budget do exists. We now state our assumptions on f .
Definition 7 (Generic Implementation at a i ). Let f : V ×B → A be a social choice function, and let a i ∈ A. We say that a payment function p : V × B → IR generically implements f at a i if
If p : V × B → IR generically implements f at a i , we say that f is generically implementable at a i .
Intuitively, the assumption requires strict inequalities (recall Claim 6.1). Notice that in Definition 7, part (4) it might be the case that p a k > β(a j ).
Definition 8. A social choice function f : V × B → A is generically implementable if for every a i ∈ A there exists a payment function p i : V × B → IR that generically implements f at a i .
Characterization
In this subsection we extend a recent characterization of revenue equivalence for multidimensional domains by Heydenreich et al.(2009) . We state our characterization result for private budgets and then briefly discuss the differences between the proof techniques. Recall that ∆ G f, B (i, i ′ ) is the length of the shortest path from node i to node i ′ in the graph G f, B .
Theorem 4 (Characterization of Revenue Equivalence).
A generically implementable social choice function f : V × B → A for private budgets satisfies the revenue equivalence principle if and only if in all corresponding graphs G f, B obtained from a combination of a player and a reported valuations and budgets of the other players we have that
Observe that f : V × B → A is implementable, and thus the proof of Theorem 4 only requires the necessary condition in Theorem 1. Therefore, Theorem 4 is applicable for private budget settings (where players can report any budget limit) satisfying the condition in Definition 8.
Essentially, the original proof of Heydenreich et al. (2009) constructs certain payments based on the specific shortest paths of the graph. However, if ∆ G f, B (i, k) = −∆ G f, B (k, i) holds then this implies that these payments can be negative. In our setting, negative payments are excluded by the no positive transfer requirement. Instead, our necessity proof (Claim 6.4) requires a subtle strongly-component argument and thus is different from theirs. Our sufficiency proof (Claim 6.4) is based on a straight-forward adaptation of Heydenreich et al. (2009) and on Theorem 1.
Examples
This section illustrates our characterization results through some examples. In this example we also have that G f, B contains a negative cycle (since min{ δ(a, a ′ ), θ(a, a ′ )} = 10, min{ δ(a ′ , a), θ(a ′ , a)} = −11) and thus
Example 2. We show an implementable f whose corresponding graph G f, B contains a negative cycle (and therefore the condition in Proposition 2 is sufficient but not necessary for implementability). Consider a single player with possible outcomes A = {a, a ′ }, possible private budgets B = {1, 5}, and possible val-
Clearly, the payment function p a = 5 and p a ′ = 0 implements f . However, min{ δ(a, a
We next consider a broad class of social choice functions known as affine maximizers. This class encompasses the extensively studied class of weighted VCG mechanisms. We begin with the definition of this class.
Definition 9. A social choice function f is called an affine maximizer if for some player weights κ 1 > 0, . . . , κ n > 0 and some outcome weights γ a ∈ IR for every a ∈ A, we have that:
We next consider a natural mechanism without money for 0/1 valuations (intuitively, each player can vote for all his most preferred alternatives, assuming all are equally desired).
Claim. The mechanism without money f (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ argmax a∈A { ℓ κ ℓ · v ℓ (a) + γ a }, where v ℓ (a) ∈ {0, 1} for every a ∈ A and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n} (assuming that ties among outcomes are broken lexicographically) satisfies the condition in Proposition 1 and therefore is dominant-strategy implementable.
As stated informally in Borgs et al.(2005) no affine maximizer is implementable with private budgets if the players can specify their budget limits in addition to reporting their valuations (since players can over-report their values while under-reporting their budgets to avoid charges). We use our characterization to address the publicly-known budget case (where players cannot misreport their budgets).
Claim. Suppose that V ℓ = IR |A| + for every player ℓ and let n ≥ 2. If at least one player has budget < ∞, then no affine maximizer is implementable with publicly-known budgets.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is the consequence of the following taxation principle lemma and claims.
Lemma 1 (Borgs et al. (2005)). Let (f, p) be an implementable mechanism for private budgets. Let
The following conditions hold:
1. For every ℓ, every v −ℓ and every B −ℓ there exist prices p a k ∈ IR, for every a k ∈ A(v −ℓ , B −ℓ ), such that for all v ℓ and all
For every v ℓ and every B ℓ we have that
Proof. If δ(a, a ′ ) = ∞, the claim trivially holds. Otherwise, for every sufficiently small ǫ > 0 there exist v and B ≥ β(a ′ ), where
Claim. Let C be a finite cycle in the graph G f,B . If f : V × B → A is implementable and l(i, k) = δ(a i , a k ) for every arc (i, k) ∈ C then C is a nonnegative cycle.
Proof. We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose there exists a finite negative cycle C in the graph G f,B such that l(i, k) = δ(a i , a k ) for every arc (i, k) ∈ C. We can assume without loss of generality that C is a simple cycle (with no repeated nodes). Otherwise, we can split it into two cycles, where one of them must clearly be negative. The process repeats until we are left with a negative simple cycle. Without loss of generality (by renaming outcomes if necessary), we assume that C = (1, 2, . . . , k), where k ≤ |A| . In particular, l(1, 2) + l(2, 3)
By Claim 6.1, δ(a i , a i+1 ) ≥ p ai − p ai+1 . Adding these inequalities together leads to
But this contradicts the assumption that C is a negative cycle.
⊓ ⊔
Claim. Let C be a finite cycle in the graph G f,B . If f : V × B → A is implementable and l(i, k) = θ(a i ) for some arc (i, k) ∈ C then C is a nonnegative cycle.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Let C be a negative cycle in the graph G f,B and let
}. By Claim 6.1, the set I + is nonempty. We can assume that C is a simple cycle (by Claim 6.1 and its proof). Without loss of generality (by renaming outcomes if necessary), we can further assume that C = (1, 2, . . . , m). Therefore, l(1, 2)+ l(2, 3)+ · · ·+ l(m− 1, m)+ l(m, 1) < 0. Now, since l(e) ≥ 0, for every arc e ∈ I + , there must exist i < k < m such that l(i, i + 1) + l(i + 1, i + 2) + · · · + l(k, k + 1) < 0, where (k, k + 1) ∈ I + and (i, i+1), (i+1, i+2), . . .,
. This implies that p a k > p ai + θ(a k ). By no positive transfer (NPT), we have p ai ≥ 0 and therefore p a k > θ(a k ). Consider two cases: Case 1. Assume first that θ(a k ) = β(a k ). By definition, there exist v, B and a small enough ǫ ≥ 0 such that f (v, B) = a k , where B = β(a k ) + ǫ. Therefore, p a k > β(a k ) + ǫ , contradicting budget feasibility (BF).
Case 2. Next assume that θ(a k ) = ω(a k ). By definition, there exist v, B and a small enough ǫ ≥ 0 such that
Proof of Theorem 2
The first direction is by Theorem 1. The other direction follows from the next two claims. We start by defining one more graph.
Definition 10 (The Graph H f,B ). Let M (H f,B ) = {0, 1, 2, . . . , |A|} be the node set of the graph, where 0 is a special node, and {1, 2, . . . , |A|} correspond to all possible outcomes. Let E(H f,B ) = E 0 ∪ E 1 ∪ E 2 be the directed arc set of the graph, where
Finally, the length of a directed arc (i, k) ∈ E(H f,B ) is defined as follows:
Claim. If G f,B contains no finite negative cycles then H f,B contains no finite negative cycles.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a finite negative cycle C in H f,B . Since all arcs in E(H f,B ) have length < ∞, it suffices to show that there exists a finite cycle C ′ in G f,B with a smaller length. First assume that e ∈ E 0 ∩C. Add e to C ′ , and notice that l(e) ≤ l H (e). Next assume that e = (i, 0) ∈ E 2 ∩ C for some i > 0. Clearly, the consecutive arc in C must have the form e ′ = (0, k) ∈ E 1 for some k > 0. Add (i, k) to C ′ , and notice that
Claim. If H f,B contains no finite negative cycles then f : V × B → A for private budgets with no budget over-reporting is implementable.
Proof. Consider the payment p ai = ∆ H f,B (i, 0), where ∆ H f,B (i, 0) denotes the length of the shortest path from node i > 0 to node 0 in the graph H f,B . Since H f,B contains no negative cycles, we have that ∆ H f,B (i, 0) > −∞. In addition, ∆ H f,B (i, 0) ≤ l H (i, 0) = θ(a i ) < ∞, since a i can be obtained for some report of the player (recall our assumption that f is onto). This shows that the payment satisfies individual rationality (IR) and budget feasibility (BF). To show no positive transfer (NPT), recall that l H (0, i) = 0 and so
To show incentive compatibility (IC), assume for the purpose of contradiction that the player can benefit from reporting v ′ , B ′ instead of its true value v and true budget B. Specifically,
′ . Importantly, since the player cannot over-report its private budget we have β(a k ) ≤ B ′ ≤ B, and therefore δ(
represents a length of a path from node i to node 0 through node k in the graph H f,B . By the above, l H (i, k)+ ∆ H f,B (k, 0) is strictly smaller than ∆ H f,B (i, 0), the length of the shortest path from node i to 0, a contradiction to the minimality of ∆ H f,B (i, 0). ⊓ ⊔
Proof of Proposition 2
We start by defining a related graph: Definition 11 (The graph H f, B ) . Let the node set of the graph be M ( H f, B ) = {0, 1, 2, . . . , |A|}. Let the directed arc set of the graph be E( H f, B ) = E 0 ∪E 1 ∪E 2 , where E 0 = {(i, k) | i, k > 0 and δ(a i , a k ) ≤ θ(a i )},
Finally, the length of the directed arc (i, k) is defined as follows: ) and therefore the graph G f,B has a negative cycle. By Theorem 2, f is not implementable, a contradiction. To prove the theorem for n > 2 players , we can add n − 2 players with zero valuations and arbitrary public budgets.
